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Agenda setting made its formal debut in a 1972 article 
authored by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw. That 
article presented the basic agenda-setting thesis: issues 
emphasized in the media frequently become the issues 
identified as most important by the public.  McCombs 
and Shaw found strong correlations between the issues 
nominated as most important by citizens of Chapel Hill, 
North Carolina and the issues emphasized by the media. 
The original article sparked extensive follow-up research 
that confirmed the proposed causal relationship between 
media coverage and judgments of issue importance (e.g., 
Beckett, 1994; Cook, et al., 1983; Iyengar & Kinder, 1989). 
Although many extensions of agenda setting have 
emerged, we focus here on the psychology of agenda set-
ting. What individual-level, psychological factors help us 
to understand the agenda-setting effects of the media? We 
Content
turn our attention to this aspect of agenda setting because 
there has been a recent surge in scholarship tackling the 
psychological underpinnings of agenda setting. This re-
search uncovers two information processing paths that 
affect how agenda setting occurs. In the following, we 
first review classic psychological explanations for agenda-
setting effects, and then proceed with a detailed discussion 
of the dual psychological paths of agenda-setting outcomes. 
Subsequently we examine how information preferences 
and selective exposure can be profitably included in the 
agenda-setting framework.  Complementing these new 
models of information processing and varying attention 
to media content and presentation cues, an expanded 
concept of psychological relevance, motivated reasoning 
goals (accuracy versus directional goals), and issue pub-
lics are discussed.
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setting, and refers to Need for Orientation as a moderator 
primarily because the majority of agenda-setting studies 
assume exposure to the content of ubiquitous media rath-
er than measuring exposure, an idea we probe more care-
fully later in this chapter. The original Chapel Hill study 
is the classic example of this research design. However, 
these content-based studies of agenda-setting are comple-
mented in the literature by attention-based studies docu-
menting explicit links between level of attention to the 
news media and the strength of agenda-setting effects 
(see, for example, Strömbäck & Kiousis, 2010).
Until recently, the only major addition to our knowl-
edge about the psychology of agenda-setting effects was 
Matthes’ (2006, 2008) new set of scales measuring Need 
for Orientation. These scales take into account the expan-
sion of agenda-setting theory subsequent to Charlotte to 
a second level of effects, attribute agenda setting, the ef-
fects of news coverage on the details of public issues and 
other topics (McCombs, lopez-Escobar & llamas, 2000; 
Takeshita & Mikami, 1995; Weaver, Graber, McCombs 
& Eyal, 1981).
However, the concept of Need for Orientation is only 
one part of the answer to the question, why do agenda 
setting effects occur? A question about why media effects 
occur can be answered in two ways. First, as is the case 
for Need for Orientation, for what reason. That is, what do 
persons bring to the media experience that determines 
the strength of any effect? From extensive research, we 
know that an individual’s level of Need for Orientation 
affects the strength of the agenda-setting effect. Beyond 
Need for Orientation, what else do people bring to the 
media experience that affects agenda setting?  In this 
chapter, we explore the contribution of people’s political 
and issue preferences on their media exposure and, in 
turn, agenda-setting effects.
There is a second way to answer the why question as 
well, by describing the manner, or the process, through 
which these effects occur. In other words, answering the 
why question by specifying what happens psychologi-
cally when people encounter the media and how that 
affects the resulting agenda-setting effects, whatever their 
strength.  In the following pages, we review recent research 
on a dual-processing model to explain agenda-setting 
effects.
Given that much remains to be known, why has there 
been a lengthy hiatus in research on the psychology of 
Five years after Chapel Hill, David Weaver introduced 
the central psychological concept of agenda setting the-
ory, Need for Orientation. This concept is defined by a 
combination of uncertainty about a topic in the news and 
how relevant people find the news about that topic to be. 
Those with high uncertainty who find the news to be quite 
relevant are defined as having high Need for Orientation. 
The seminal Chapel Hill study (McCombs & Shaw, 1972) 
was tightly focused on the effects of news coverage about 
public issues among undecided voters in the 1968 U.S. 
presidential election. The decision to study undecided 
voters turned out to be particularly fortuitous. These 
citizens had the precise combination of feeling uncertain, 
but finding the news relevant, that gives rise to heightened 
agenda-setting effects. The concept of Need for Orienta-
tion, however, was not introduced formally until five years 
after the Chapel Hill study. The Charlotte study (Shaw 
& McCombs, 1977) examined the agenda-setting effects 
of news coverage across the summer and fall of the 1972 
U.S. presidential election among the general population 
of voters. In addition to showing the broad agenda-setting 
effects of the news media on the public, this study intro-
duced Need for Orientation as a psychological moderator 
of these effects (Weaver, 1977).
Need for Orientation measures voters’ desire for more 
information on the issues and provides a robust explana-
tion for the strength of agenda setting effects. In Charlotte, 
the correspondence between the media agenda and public 
agenda of issues in October was only 0.29 for voters with 
a low Need for Orientation. Among voters with a high 
Need for Orientation, the correspondence between the 
media agenda and public agenda of issues was 0.68. In 
the years since Charlotte, the concept of Need for Orien-
tation has provided similarly strong explanations for 
variations in the level of agenda-setting effects among 
general populations in countries around the world. 
In line with most discussions of the concept, we iden-
tify Need for Orientation as a moderator variable, yet note 
that an argument can be made that it is an antecedent 
variable, namely that the full theoretical model is: NFO 
g media exposure g agenda setting. Weaver’s original 
presentation of the concept in The Emergence of American 
Political Issues (Shaw & McCombs, 1977) reported findings 
supporting this full model. However, in the decades since 
the original findings from the 1972 Charlotte study, most 
research has used the truncated model, NFO g agenda 
McCombs & Stroud
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in turn, can affect the issues they name as most important. 
Here, Scott Althaus and David Tewksbury (2002) con-
ducted an inf luential experiment to test how agenda 
setting works online, where people have extensive media 
choices. Work by subsequent scholars added to the idea 
that those using new media seek information on issues of 
interest (Kim, 2007) and nominate more diverse issues 
as most important (Nie, Miller, Golde, Butler & Winneg, 
2010). A second stream of research looks at how people’s 
preference for likeminded political news affects agenda 
setting. Using partisan media can change the issues and 
attributes considered important (e.g., Stroud, 2011). More 
recently, lindita Camaj (2012) presented a paper at the 
Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Com-
munication that brought the concepts of Need for Orien-
tation, selective exposure, and attribute agenda-setting 
effects into our theoretical view of the psychological paths 
to agenda-setting effects. This expanded theoretical view 
is grounded empirically in content analysis and survey 
research from Kosovo.
In this extended review, our mission is to integrate 
diverse research into a broad theoretical model of the 
psychological underpinnings of agenda-setting effects. 
To do so, we combine recent literature on dual-processing 
models and selective exposure to account for the interac-
tion between individual psychology and the modern me-
dia environment in producing agenda-setting effects.
A preliminary theoretical map
… there might be two types of agenda setting: a delib-
erate ‘genuine’ agenda  setting involving active infer-
ence and an automatic ‘pseudo’ agenda setting  ex-
plained by the accessibility bias.
Takeshita (2006, p.279)
Toshio Takeshita’s conclusion about the possibility of 
two psychological processes leading to agenda-setting 
effects results from his careful explication of the concept 
of salience in the agenda-setting tradition. The starting 
point for this explication is his disagreement with two 
theoretical papers (Price and Tewksbury, 1997; Scheufele, 
2000) grounded in cognitive psychology’s knowledge 
activation model, a model defined in terms of accessibil-
ity and applicability. These papers argued that salience 
the agenda-setting process? Two reasons immediately 
come to mind. First, the concept of Need for Orientation 
provided a detailed and precise connection between in-
dividual, psychological motivations and agenda-setting 
effects. Scholars across the world found Need for Orien-
tation to be a useful concept, and there was no obvious 
gap in our knowledge about the variations in the level of 
effects. In many ways, the empirical success of the concept 
offered little encouragement for additional research. We 
also need to consider a second reason, a strong tradition 
of emphasis in mass communication research on media 
effects. Subsequent to Chapel Hill and Charlotte, scholars 
were attracted to investigations of attribute agenda set-
ting, the second level of agenda-setting effects and to a 
variety of other effects, including the extended impact of 
both basic first-level and second-level agenda-setting ef-
fects on subsequent attitudes, opinions and behavior and 
the effects of a variety of sources on the shaping of the 
media agenda (McCombs, 2014).
The combined impact of these factors was a lack of 
new theoretical initiatives regarding the psychology of 
the agenda-setting process until very recently. These new 
initiatives, which will be reviewed and elaborated here in 
detail, complement Need for Orientation’s important role 
as a moderator concept with new insights into what mem-
bers of the public bring to the communication setting and 
how dual psychological paths of information processing 
inf luence the media experience and, in turn, agenda-
setting effects.
Our review and discussion of this new phase of agen-
da-setting research begins with Toshio Takeshita’s semi-
nal 2006 paper in the International Journal of Public Opinion 
Research suggesting two distinct routes between exposure 
and agenda-setting effects. Subsequently, three German 
scholars, Kristin Bulkow, Juliane Urban, and Wolfgang 
Schweiger (2013) explored these paths in two extensive 
experiments. Their ground-breaking research was followed 
by Raymond Pingree and Elizabeth Stoycheff’s (2013) 
creative experiment in the United States that provided 
succinct names for these paths, agenda-cueing and agen-
da-reasoning. These works advance our understanding 
of the psychological process by which media exposure 
can yield agenda-setting effects.
A complementary research trajectory looks at the news 
that people select. One stream of research focuses on how 
people’s issue interests affect their news selections, which, 
McCombs & Stroud
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definition of salience as accessibility, Kim, Scheufele, 
and Shanahan (2002) designed an attribute agenda-setting 
study that focused on the accessibility of six attributes of 
an urban development issue in a small American city. 
Accessibility of the issue attributes was measured by the 
proportion of survey respondents who indicated Don’t 
Know or Neutral opinions on questions that asked how 
likely it was for each attribute to happen as a consequence 
of the proposed urban development. The assumption was 
that the smaller the proportion of Don’t Know and Neutral 
opinions, the more accessible an attribute was among 
respondents.
As hypothesized, the accessibility of these issue at-
tributes increased sharply with greater exposure to the 
local newspaper. Further, accessibility among survey 
respondents who were heavily exposed to the local news 
(High Exposure) and accessibility among respondents 
who were not exposed to the local news (No Exposure) 
differed depending on how frequently the attribute was 
covered in the media. However, the resulting attribute 
agenda among the public based on accessibility did not 
correspond to the attribute agenda presented in that news 
coverage. 
There was, however, no apparent correspondence 
of salience of attributes between the media and their 
audience. Among both High and Medium Exposure 
respondents, Increased Sales-Tax Revenues, Increased 
Potential for Flooding, and Increased Traffic, which were 
emphasized in the media, were not more salient (ac-
cessible) than other attributes. Particularly, the Increased 
Potential for Flooding was in fact the least salient at-
tribute among High Exposure and Medium Exposure 
respondents. (Kim, Scheufele & Shanahan, 2002, pp.16-
17)
The results of their study in which salience was op-
erationalized as accessibility failed to replicate the at-
tribute agenda-setting effects found over many decades 
(Benton & Frazier 1976; Weaver et al. 1981; Mikami, 
Takeshita, Nakada & Kawabata, 1994;  McCombs, lopez-
Escobar & llamas, 2000). 
More directly examining accessibility, Miller (2007) 
reported two laboratory experiments testing the hypoth-
esis that accessibility mediates the relationship between 
media exposure and agenda-setting effects. Using a dif-
ferent operational definition of accessibility in the two 
experiments, she found no support for the hypothesis. In 
is synonymous with accessibility, or the ease with which 
concepts are retrieved from memory, and that agenda-
setting effects can be explained on the basis of accessibil-
ity alone. Takeshita takes issue with this theoretical as-
sertion on two grounds. First, he notes that theoretically 
the definition of salience frequently includes two compo-
nents, accessibility and perceived importance (young, 
1992; Rössler and Eichhorn, 1999), and that not all eas-
ily accessible ideas are automatically regarded as being 
important. Second, he notes that the historical origins of 
the concept of salience in agenda setting center on the 
idea of perceived importance. One of the most common 
measures of issue salience among the public in agenda-
setting studies is the Gallup Poll’s MIP question: “What 
is the most important problem facing this country today?.” 
This question asks not only which issues are readily ac-
tivated from memory, Takeshita contends, but also which 
of those issues are important.
Roles of accessibility and perceived impor-
tance in media effects
Empirical research adds to the notion that accessibil-
ity is an incomplete explanation of media effects. Nelson, 
Clawson and Oxley (1997) empirically distinguished 
between the concepts of accessibility and perceived im-
portance in an experiment comparing the effects of TV 
news stories that presented two different attributes of a 
highly publicized rally by the white supremacist group, 
the Ku Klux Klan (KKK). The contrasting sets of stories 
stressed free speech versus public order. In the experiment, 
accessibility was measured by timing participants’ re-
sponses to stimulus-related words on a computer screen. 
Perceived importance was measured with a self-report 
questionnaire. Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley concluded: 
Media framing of the KKK controversy signifi-
cantly affected tolerance for the group, and this effect 
came about primarily because the two frames stressed 
the relevance or importance of different values (free 
speech versus public order), not because the frames 
altered the cognitive accessibility of these values. 
[p.574] …Our results point to a more deliberative in-
tegration process, whereby participants consider the 
importance and relevance of each accessible idea. 
[p.578]
In a study drawing specifically upon Scheufele’s (2000) 
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(Shaw & McCombs, 1977), the initial large-scale study of 
agenda setting among the general public, notes the simi-
larity between agenda setting and the status conferral 
function of the mass media (lazarsfeld & Merton, 1948) 
because both ideas concern the salience of objects. “This 
suggests,” said Takeshita (2006, p.278), “that the founders 
must have meant salience to stand for perceived impor-
tance because the concept of status conferral asserts that 
the mass media bestow prestige or importance on certain 
individuals just by paying attention to them.”
Although Takeshita makes the case that the dominant 
psychological path to agenda-setting effects is defined by 
salience as perceived importance, he concludes that “ … 
there might be two types of agenda setting: a deliberate 
‘genuine’ agenda setting involving active inference and 
an automatic ‘pseudo’ agenda setting explained by the 
accessibility bias.” He set the stage for the further explo-
ration of these paths to agenda setting.
Mapping the duality of agenda-setting
On the one hand, information is captured inciden-
tally, which implies that it is processed subconscious-
ly. On the other hand, audience members actively look 
for information…. Since not every issue has equal 
personal meaning for all audience members, it will be 
processed more peripherally by some and more cen-
trally by others.
Bulkow et al.(2013, pp.44 & 47)
Advancing the theoretical map of these two paths, 
Kristin Bulkow, Juliane Urban, and Wolfgang Schweiger 
focused their research on the conditions under which 
agenda-setting effects occur. As they noted (p.45), “there 
is evidence indicating that the learning of issue salience 
is neither an automatic nor an intentional process for all 
audience members with regard to all issues.”
Most people are routinely and casually exposed to a 
vast amount of information about the issues of the day. 
With an ever-expanding medley of communication chan-
nels, ranging from traditional newspapers and television 
news to a variety of personal media such as Facebook and 
Twitter, citizens become aware of many topics and issues. 
In some instances, this casual incidental exposure is suf-
ficient to produce agenda-setting effects. However, some 
her studies, Miller randomly assigned study participants 
to one of three different conditions. One set of participants 
read an article explaining that the crime rate was high, a 
second set of participants read an article saying that crime 
was declining, and a third set did not read a crime article. 
If accessibility were responsible for agenda-setting effects, 
participants in the crime high and crime low conditions 
should display similar agenda-setting effects. yet those 
reading the crime high article were more likely to name 
crime as important compared to participants reading the 
crime low article. In a second study, Miller shows that 
accessibility is unlikely to explain the findings. She gave 
respondents a word completion task, asking them to fill 
in the blanks of word fragments. If crime is highly acces-
sible, _UN would be gun instead of sun or fun. Contradict-
ing the idea that accessibility explains agenda-setting 
effects, Miller found that crime was more accessible for 
those reading the low crime article than those reading the 
high crime article – exactly the opposite of what an ac-
cessibility explanation would suggest.
Within the agenda-setting tradition, research on Need 
for Orientation demonstrates that the salience of issues 
among members of the public involves more than the ac-
cessibility of those issues as a consequence of the fre-
quency with which they have appeared in the news. An 
individual’s cognitive involvement with an issue, spe-
cifically each individual’s perception of the issue’s rele-
vance and desire for additional information about the 
issue, moderates the strength of the media’s agenda-setting 
effect. As Takeshita (2006, p.277) noted, “Not all easily 
accessible ideas, however, are automatically regarded as 
important.” The Bill Clinton-Monica lewinsky scandal 
is a case in point. Despite intensive press coverage that 
made the details of the scandal highly accessible, the 
public gave a collective shrug regarding its importance 
(yioutas & Segvic, 2003).
Historical origins of salience in agenda setting
Takeshita observes that mass communication effects 
research in general and agenda-setting research in par-
ticular have their roots in the classic voting studies of the 
1940s, not in cognitive psychology. The first footnote in 
the seminal 1968 Chapel Hill study (McCombs & Shaw, 
1972) cites the 1948 Elmira study (Berelson, lazarsfeld 
and McPhee, 1954). In addition, the 1972 Charlotte study 
McCombs & Stroud
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daily news story vs. an occasional news story) and by the 
prominence of the presentation (lead story vs. short report). 
In other words, there were four experimental groups based 
on these variations in the media agenda. Participants were 
instructed to visit the experimental website every day for 
two weeks, but were completely free in their choice of 
articles. Based on the log-files of their behavior on these 
visits, three groups were identified: Non-readers, Readers, 
and Heavy Readers. A series of surveys across the two 
weeks collected additional information, including judg-
ments of issue importance and involvement with the ex-
perimental issue prior to their first web visit. This initial 
level of involvement with the issue of nuclear waste dis-
posal was used as a covariate in subsequent analyses of 
the agenda-setting effect observed in the experiment. This 
was an important control because initial involvement 
predicted the amount of reading on the website and the 
initial level of importance attached to the issue. 
In interpreting the results from the experiment, Bulkow 
et al. assumed a peripheral information processing route 
for the Non-readers, who had not read a single article on 
the experimental issue. A moderate central processing 
route was assumed for Readers and a stronger central 
processing route was assumed for Heavy Readers.
For Non-readers, the development of issue importance 
depended on the prominence of the news articles, lead 
stories versus short reports.  Non-readers’ judgments also 
were affected by the interaction of the two media cues 
(prominence and frequency) so that the impact of lead 
stories was particularly distinct when the lead stories 
appeared every day. In the case of short reports, issue 
importance decreased slightly no matter if the articles 
appeared every day or only occasionally.
Readers’ judgments of issue importance also were 
inf luenced by the prominence of the news articles, but 
not their frequency of appearance. There are two alterna-
tive explanations for this outcome, according to Bulkow 
et al. The differences in issue importance could be the 
result of the issue’s prominence in the news (a peripheral 
cue) or the result of the amount of information that Read-
ers obtained about the issue from short reports versus lead 
stories.
In contrast to both Non-Readers and Readers, Heavy 
Readers’ judgments about the importance of the nuclear 
waste disposal issue were not inf luenced by media cues, 
neither the prominence of the news articles nor their 
of these issues and topics – those that resonate with an 
individual because of personal interests, needs, or goals 
– are the subject of further deliberation and cognitive 
processing. As McCombs (1999, p.154) observed, “Wheth-
er events are noticed, whether persons take any interest 
in a problem, depends on their own personal situation.”
Bulkow et al. identify this level of “personal involve-
ment” as a key factor in identifying which path, an auto-
matic or deliberative one, explains agenda-setting out-
comes: “Since not every issue has equal personal meaning 
for all audience members, it will be processed more pe-
ripherally by some and more centrally by others.”
When issue involvement is low, they argue, people will 
process information via a peripheral route (Petty & Ca-
cioppo, 1986). This process will be largely unconscious 
and rely upon peripheral cues, such as the emphasis placed 
on the issue in the media, to determined issue importance. 
Effects resulting from this more superficial route will be 
unstable (Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981).
On the other hand, argue Bulkow et al., when issue 
involvement is high, people will process information via 
a central route that is conscious and more systematic. For 
example, Graber (1988) observed that only when someone 
regards an issue as relevant to their personal situation 
will they read a news article in detail and think about its 
content. Petty and Cacioppo (1986) note that the more 
central the information processing route, the less inf lu-
ential that peripheral cues will be and the stronger and 
more persistent will be the effects. 
Based on these arguments, Bulkow et al. designed two 
experiments to test these hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: The more a person is involved with 
an issue, the more likely this person will determine 
the importance of the issue via a central route in the 
agenda-setting process.
Hypothesis 2: If information processing is more 
peripheral, media cues will have more inf luence on 
the audience members’ importance perception.
Experiment one: presentation effects
The website created for the experiment contained cur-
rent news articles from actual news media, plus articles 
about an issue, nuclear waste disposal, that was not in 
the news during the time of the experiment. Coverage of 
this issue was varied by the frequency of the coverage (a 
Psychology of  Agenda-Setting Effects
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tained current news articles from actual news media, plus 
articles about a fictitious issue, new border crossings 
between Germany and Poland. Articles on the experi-
mental issue contained either explicit or implicit evalua-
tions about the importance of the issue. Explicit articles 
labeled the issue as “important” whereas implicit articles 
indicated its importance by presenting the possible con-
sequences of the issue. In addition to the two experimen-
tal groups based on these variations in the media agenda, 
there was a control group whose articles on the experi-
mental issue contained no journalistic evaluations. Par-
ticipants viewed the experimental website on three con-
secutive days, but were completely free in their choice of 
articles. Based on the log-files of how much time partici-
pants spent reading the articles on the experimental issue 
during these visits, three groups were identified: light 
Readers, Readers, and Heavy Readers. Surveys conduct-
ed prior to the experiment, at the end of the experiment, 
and one week later measured judgments of issue impor-
tance.
The trend in issue importance was similar across the 
time of the experiment when there were implicit or no 
evaluations in the news stories, but differed when the 
stories contained explicit evaluations. Bulkow et al. as-
sumed that articles with implicit or no evaluations are 
processed in a more active, central, and deliberative man-
ner. Both require recipients to make sense of the issue on 
their own. Articles with explicit evaluations can be pro-
cessed peripherally, they assume. Combining the im-
plicit or no evaluation groups and comparing them with 
the group receiving explicit evaluations revealed a sig-
nificant treatment effect among Readers and a weak 
treatment effect among light Readers. There were no 
treatment effects among Heavy Readers, who read the 
articles more attentively. Assuming central processing of 
the articles by this group, it is plausible that the presence 
of explicit, implicit, or no evaluations resulted in similar 
outcomes regarding the importance of the issue.
Bulkow et al.’s summary of the two paths to agenda 
setting, peripheral agenda setting and central agenda 
setting, is presented in Figure 1. The key theoretical ele-
ments distinguishing these paths are issue involvement, 
incidental exposure / information-seeking, peripheral / 
central processing, relevance of presentation and content 
cues, and the stability of the agenda-setting outcomes. 
frequency of appearance. And based on the final survey 
among participants, which was conducted a week after 
their final visit to the experimental website, the agenda-
setting effects among the Non-Readers and Readers 
largely disappeared. In other words, in the absence of 
continuing news coverage, the effects were not very per-
sistent. In contrast, the agenda-setting effects among 
Heavy Readers remained stable.
In sum, high involvement with an issue is more likely 
to result in reading more articles about the issue and more 
persistent effects, which Bulkow et al. interpret as a cen-
tral route to agenda setting. lower involvement with an 
issue is more likely to result in reading fewer articles – or 
no articles at all – about the issue and less persistent ef-
fects, which Bulkow et al.interpret as a peripheral route 
to agenda-setting.
Experiment two: content effects
In a second experiment, Bulkow et al. shifted from 
presentation effects, the frequency and prominence of news 
stories on an issue, to content effects on judgments of issue 
importance. Specifically, they investigated the inf luence 
of journalists’ evaluations in news stories of an issue’s 
importance, drawing upon Jörg Matthes’ (2006, 2008) 
expanded set of scales measuring three aspects of Need 
for Orientation. In addition to NFO regarding an issue, 
the first level of agenda setting, two additional measures 
in the Matthes’ scales examine need for orientation to 
specific aspects of an issue. The additional measures in 
the Matthes’ scales take into account two aspects of sec-
ond-level agenda setting, the substantive attributes of the 
issue under consideration and the affective attributes of 
the issue, specifically the journalistic evaluations found 
in commentaries and editorials.
Two hypotheses specified the processing and effects 
of explicit versus implicit evaluations:
Hypothesis 1: If information processing is more pe-
ripheral, explicit journalistic evaluations will have more 
inf luence on the audience members’ perception of 
importance.
Hypothesis 2: If information processing is more delib-
erative, implicit journalistic evaluations will have more 
inf luence on the audience members’ perception of 
importance. 
The website created for the second experiment con-
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Explicating the concept of relevance
The media can stimulate agenda-setting effects, but 
the magnitude of these effects is moderated by a vari-
ety of individual differences. Among these moderators, 
the accumulated evidence regarding need for orienta-
tion suggests that in particular a key moderator variable 
is relevance.
McCombs & lee (2013, pp.48-49)
Although the concept of Need for Orientation is defined 
by two sub-concepts, relevance and uncertainty (Weaver, 
1977), relevance is the initial defining concept. Uncer-
tainty plays a secondary role of distinguishing between 
moderate and high NFO for persons who consider a 
topic relevant. Over the past decade or so, this key concept, 
the relevance of public issues and other agenda items, has 
been examined afresh from a variety of perspectives. 
Collectively, these recent studies form the theoretical 
gestalt diagramed in Figure 2.
The concept of relevance explicated here is theoreti-
cally distinct from the concept of importance in agenda-
Either path, they note (p.59, italics added):
can lead to the same result, even if the initial issue 
importance differs with the degree of involvement. 
Our findings show that less involved persons, who 
initially did not assign much importance to an issue 
and did not pay much attention to the issue-related 
coverage, estimated the issue as important as the high-
involved, prejudiced, and attentive persons, if the 
media emphasis placed on the issue was strong enough.
From this perspective agenda-setting, as it was 
originally devised, homogenizes the public opinion by 
bringing in line the judgments of involved and unin-
volved persons for issues, which are regarded as im-
portant by the media at a certain point of time. Thus 
it widens the view of audience members beyond their per-
sonal life for problems in the society as a whole.
In their discussion of future research on these two 
paths to agenda setting, Bulkow et al. note that their 
experiments examined only one aspect of the relevance 
of an issue for an individual, personal issue importance. 
Figure 1. Process model for dual agenda-setting.
PERIPHERAl PATH DElIBERATIVE PATH
low ISSUE INVOlVEMENT High
Incidental ExPOSURE TO ISSUE INFORMATION Deliberate
Peripheral INFORMATION PROCESSING Central
High RElEVANCE OF MEDIA CUES low
low RElEVANCE OF CONTENT High
Unstable AGENDA-SETTING EFFECTS Stable
Figure 2. Relevance: A theoretical gestalt defined by recent research.
TyPES OF RElEVANCE (Bouza, 2004; Evatt & Ghanem, 2001)
Personal Relevance Social Relevance Emotional Relevance 
SOURCES OF RElEVANCE 
(McCombs, 1999)
Self – interest Civic duty Emotional arousal
Avocation Peer inf luence
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setting theory. For example, importance, frequently mea-
sured by the question “What is the most important 
problem facing the country today?,” asks respondents to 
make a judgment about priorities. That is, to select a 
single item from a larger set as the most important of all. 
On the other hand, relevance defines the boundaries of 
that larger set of items. Not all issues are deemed relevant 
by an individual and not all relevant issues are equally 
important. The measurement of relevance typically is 
measured in terms of the larger environment in which 
those issues are embedded. In Weaver’s (1977) original 
work on Need for Orientation, his measures of relevance 
included indices of political interest, political discussion, 
and political participation. 
Explicating the basic dimensions of relevance, Dixie 
Evatt and Salma Ghanem (2001) analyzed the public’s 
response to eight different issues on a set of 13 semantic 
differential scales. Their analysis of these data identified 
two substantive aspects of issue salience, personal rele-
vance and social relevance as well as an affective aspect 
of issue salience, emotional relevance.
Spanish sociologist Fermin Bouza (2004, p.250) made 
a similar theoretical distinction to identify the impact area 
of political communication:
… individuals maintain an important area of per-
sonal interests that is separated, to a certain degree, 
from what that individual considers to be public inter-
ests or everyone’s interests…This clear distinction 
between an area of personal interests and another area 
of public interests makes the existence of an area that 
I will define as the impact area of political communi-
cations possible…because it is the area in which the 
individual feels a clear coincidence between the coun-
try and himself…
Approaching the concept of relevance from a different 
perspective, a pair of statewide polls in Texas asked why 
respondents named a particular issue in response to the 
widely used Gallup MIP question, “What is the most 
important problem facing this country today?” (McCombs, 
1999). Using a set of questions developed to probe the 
resonance of an issue for each survey respondent, Mc-
Combs’ analysis of these polls from 1992 and 1996 iden-
tified a stable set of five sources of issue relevance: self-
interest, avocation, civic duty, peer inf luence, and 
emotional arousal. As Figure 2 indicates, these five mo-
tivations dovetail with Evatt and Ghanem’s distinctions 
between personal salience, social salience, and emo-
tional salience. The Texas measures of self-interest and 
avocation ref lect personal salience; the measures of civic 
duty and peer inf luence ref lect social salience; and emo-
tional arousal obviously ref lects emotional salience, as 
shown in Figure 2.
Bulkow et al. noted that their experiments examined 
only one aspect of the relevance of an issue for an indi-
vidual, personal issue salience. Future research on these 
dual paths of information processing and agenda-setting 
effects should investigate issues that are socially relevant 
and emotionally relevant to individuals to complement 
the research discussed above on personally relevant issues.
Agenda cueing and agenda reasoning
Substantial agenda setting effects were found using a 
pure agenda cue without any exposure to agenda rea-
sons, suggesting that cueing is an important mechanism 
of agenda setting. Further, these effects were concen-
trated among those with high gatekeeping trust … . 
For audience members lower in gatekeeping trust, 
agenda setting effects were strengthened by the inclu-
sion of agenda reasons supporting the cue, suggesting 
that when the mere presence of coverage is not seen 
as a valid agenda cue, audience members require sub-
stantive information about problem importance that 
can be used in making their own systematic importance 
judgments.
Pingree and Stoycheff (2013, p.864)
Continuing the theoretical mapping of the dual psy-
chological paths that result in agenda-setting effects, 
Raymond Pingree and Elizabeth Stoycheff’s experiment 
advances the distinction made by Bulkow et al. (2013) 
between presentation cues in the media about the importance 
of an issue, such as prominence and frequency, and the 
actual content of the media, information about the impor-
tance of the issue. 
Participants in the agenda-cueing experimental group 
saw modified versions of The Pew Research Center’s 
Project for Excellence in Journalism’s weekly report on 
the five most-covered issues in the news. These reports 
are based on large national samples of approximately 
1,000 news stories from 52 mainstream news outlets. One 
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of the experiment. “Conceptually, the most important 
contribution of this study,” conclude Pingree and Stoy-
cheff, “is to differentiate agenda cueing not only from 
agenda reasoning, but also from the commonly assumed 
heuristic of cognitive accessibility.” The shortcut here 
that defines agenda cueing is the frequency of an issue 
on the media agenda per se, a heuristic grounded in gate-
keeping trust, the belief that the news judgments ref lect-
ed in the media agenda are largely based on judgments 
about how important a problem is. In contrast, agenda 
reasoning is based on the content of the news.
…our conceptualizations of the two processes 
specifies differences in the independent variable as 
well as differences in mechanisms. In particular, agen-
da cueing effects are effects of the mere fact of news 
coverage of an issue, regardless of its content, and 
agenda reasoning effects are effects of information 
contained in news stories that is useful for systemati-
cally reasoning about issue priorities. (p.864)
Pingree and Stoycheff describe their dual process 
model as a complement and contrast to the model advanced 
by Bulkow et al. They describe their model as memory-
based that specifies processes that occur during some 
later moment of agenda response whereas they interpret 
the Bulkow et al. model as focused on cognitive mecha-
nisms that occur in response to each news story examined. 
The integration and further exploration of these perspec-
tives is an item for future research.
Both of these experiments focused on issue salience, 
the traditional focus of first-level agenda setting. The 
frontier beyond these experiments is investigations of 
these dual paths to agenda setting at the second level, 
attribute agenda setting, and the emerging third-level of 
agenda setting, which is grounded in the salience of net-
works of objects, attributes, or both (Guo, 2013; Guo, Vu, 
& McCombs, 2012) rather than the salience of discrete 
objects (the first level of agenda setting) or attributes (the 
second level of agenda setting). Although there may be 
unique psychological aspects to each level of agenda-
setting, “the core theoretical idea [of agenda setting] is 
that elements prominent in the media pictures not only 
become prominent in the public’s pictures, but also come 
to be regarded as especially important” (McCombs, 2014, 
p. 39). Thus we suggest that there may be similar dual-
paths for other agenda-setting levels.
version of this agenda cue in the experiment listed the 
national debt as the top story of the week. Another version 
listed unemployment as the top issue of the week. In short, 
these were pure presentation cues about which issue ap-
peared most frequently in the news. Participants in the 
agenda-reasoning group saw these same two versions of 
the Pew report, but with additional information support-
ing the importance of the top issue (either the national 
debt or unemployment).
In addition to this important distinction between pre-
sentation cues and content cues that characterize the 
peripheral and deliberative paths to agenda setting, re-
spectively, Pingree and Stoycheff introduced a key con-
tingent condition, gatekeeping trust, that affected which 
type of cue an individual was more likely to utilize in 
making a judgment about an issue’s importance. In con-
trast to the conceptualization of media trust as a general 
attitude about the credibility or trustworthiness of the 
news media (Gaziano & McGrath, 1986; Tsfati, 2003), 
gatekeeping trust more specifically is the perception that 
journalists have done the “heavy lifting” to determine 
the importance of issues and that their news judgments 
are useful cognitive shortcuts to use in determining the 
importance of an issue. Gatekeeping trust is measured 
with items such as “News outlets choose which stories to 
cover by carefully deciding which issues or problems are 
the most important in society.” As illustrated by this item, 
there is an assumption that the presentation of issues in 
the news results from the prioritizing of issues by journal-
ists based on the issues’ importance when they create their 
news programs, newspapers, and web sites (Pingree, 
Quenette, Tchernev & Dickinson, 2013). For individuals 
with higher gatekeeping trust, presentation cues are a 
useful cognitive shortcut. However, for individuals with 
lower gatekeeping trust, presentation cues are inadequate 
and content cues are more useful.
Utilizing this concept of gatekeeping trust, Pingree 
and Stoycheff tested two key hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: For a pure presentation cue, the agenda-
setting effects will be stronger for those with higher 
gatekeeping trust.
Hypothesis 2: For those with lower gatekeeping trust, 
the agenda-setting effects will be stronger when infor-
mation is included about the issue’s importance than 
when this information is absent.
Both hypotheses were strongly supported by the results 
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importance on the basis of how frequently these issues 
appear in the news, is characteristic of the peripheral route 
to agenda setting. Agenda reasoning, making judgments 
about issue importance on the basis of media content, is 
characteristic of the deliberative route to agenda setting. 
Frequency can be useful for those following a delib-
erative path, not as a cue per se, but rather as an indicator 
of the opportunity to attend to the actual content about 
the issue. The valuable theoretical contribution by Pingree 
and Stoycheff is the separation of these two interpretations 
of frequency, sheer appearance versus opportunity for 
deliberation. The success of agenda-setting studies over 
the years in finding strong effects stems from its tradi-
tional reliance on the frequency of objects and attributes 
in the news, a situation that stimulates the creation of 
effects along both paths, albeit for entirely different rea-
sons.
Prominence seems less important for persons pursuing 
either path. It has a secondary role in the first German 
experiment. And revisiting a seldom-cited finding from 
the Chapel Hill study, there was no difference in the 
agenda-setting effects of major and minor news reports 
(0.967 vs 0.979). Major reports included the lead stories 
of newspapers and TV newscasts and lengthy stories in 
either medium and in news magazines. Minor reports 
were smaller in terms of space, time, or display. One in-
terpretation, of course, is that those high Need for Ori-
entation undecided voters in Chapel Hill were in a delib-
erative mode where any appearance of an item about an 
issue was an opportunity to learn something about the 
substance of the issue.
In any event, the frequent appearance of news about 
a particular object or topic is useful for both the periph-
eral and deliberative paths, but its utility sharply differs 
in terms of whether agenda cueing versus agenda reason-
ing occurs.
Individual choices of media content
The traditional mass media are in decline as audi-
ences shift to more individualized media, and, par-
tially as a result, the ability of leaders to hold large 
social systems together is also in decline because citi-
zens are as likely to seek out messages from other 
individuals or groups who think like themselves as 
The audience experience
Agenda-setting is a robust and widespread effect of 
mass communication, an effect that results from spe-
cific content in the mass media….Mass communication 
effects can sometimes result, as many of the early 
scholars believed, from the sheer volume of exposure. 
First-level agenda-setting effects demonstrate that 
phenomenon to some extent. But, as attribute agenda-
setting shows, closer attention to the specific content 
of media messages provides a more detailed under-
standing of the pictures in our heads …
McCombs (2014, pp.79 & 97, italics added)
Media content, not amount of exposure, is paramount 
in agenda setting. The Chapel Hill study, like many oth-
ers that followed, did not even measure exposure to the 
news media. Exposure to the widely disseminated mes-
sages of the news media was assumed. This focus on the 
media content, rather than exposure, is manifest in the 
common tandem use of content analysis and survey re-
search as the methodologies of most agenda-setting stud-
ies. The emphasis on media content also underlies the 
common research strategy of comparing specific aspects 
of the media content – the frequency with which issues 
appear in the news, to cite the most common example – 
with citizens’ responses to survey questions about aspects 
of this content – for example, the Gallup Poll’s question 
about the most important issue facing the country.
The experiments conducted by Bulkow et al. in Ger-
many and by Pingree and Stoycheff in the U.S. further 
identify and specify the aspects of media content that are 
key in the agenda-setting process. In both experiments, 
the frequency with which issues appear in the news is an 
important cue for those following the peripheral path. 
The second German experiment focused on the nature of 
the content in the news stories – explicit journalistic 
evaluations of the issue’s importance versus implicit eval-
uations of the issue’s importance grounded in discussion 
of the consequences of the issue. In this second experi-
ment, explicit evaluations were significant for participants 
on the peripheral path, but not for participants taking the 
deliberative path.
The Pingree and Stoycheff experiment further expli-
cates the distinction between presentation cues and con-
tent cues. Agenda cueing, making judgments about issue 
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citizens can monitor websites or watch television programs 
targeting their specific interest. This development raises 
a fundamental question for agenda setting: Will the me-
dia continue to affect the issues people consider to be 
important, or will people’s impressions of important issues 
affect their media diet? We return to this question after 
considering some relevant evidence.
People pursue their unique interests when making 
media choices, particularly online. young Mie Kim (2009) 
conducted a creative study by unobtrusively observing 
people’s online behavior. Study participants were given 
a CD filled with websites about the candidates for a 2004 
United States Senate seat. Participants answered questions 
about how personally important they found each of seven 
different issues and then they browsed the CD at their 
leisure. For six of the seven issues (education being the 
exception), those finding the issue personally important 
selected more web pages about the issue and spent more 
time on issue-relevant pages than those finding the issue 
less important. Further, across all seven issues, those 
selecting more issue-related pages had higher levels of 
knowledge about the issue. In sum, those driven by an 
interest in particular issues used the Internet to seek ad-
ditional information on these issues.
The implication for agenda setting is that those using 
the Internet for newsgathering may identify a more diverse 
set of issues as important because they pursue their unique 
interests. Two studies provide evidence for this idea. Us-
ing a cross-sectional survey, Norman Nie and his col-
leagues (2010) asked respondents to indicate the most 
important issue facing the U.S. from a list of seven issues 
and an Other category. The authors then categorized re-
spondents into two groups, those who used the Internet 
for news and those who used television, but not the In-
ternet, for news. Comparing these groups, the authors 
found that those using the Internet for news were more 
likely to select “other” and nominate an unlisted issue as 
most important. Further, Internet news users were more 
likely to select one of the three least common listed issues 
than those relying on television news. The causal direc-
tion, however, is ambiguous. It could be that the media 
had no effect, but instead those with diverse interests 
chose the Internet for news and those whose interests 
coincided with the more salient issues at the time preferred 
watching television news. Alternatively, online and tele-
vised news may have affected audiences differently, with 
they are to remain committed to messages that repre-
sent the entire group.
(Shaw & Hamm, 1997, p. 210)
Shaw and Hamm ask a fundamental question: does a 
heightened ability to choose media affect people’s beliefs 
about which issues are important? Building on this ques-
tion, we turn to another aspect of the psychology of agen-
da-setting effects and the audience experience: the media 
selections that people make. Quite obviously, two people 
reading the same newspaper, or browsing the same web-
site, will pay attention to different things. If people are 
able to pick and choose their news sources, and specific 
articles within those sources, do the news media retain 
their agenda-setting effect? The answer to this question 
is deeply related to a psychological perspective on how 
agenda setting occurs in the first place. We find, as de-
tailed in the paragraphs below, evidence that selectivity 
may change aggregate levels of agenda setting, but there 
is little evidence that the basic, psychological processes 
underlying agenda setting have shifted. By integrating 
recent selection and agenda-setting research, we return 
to the question of how agenda setting relates to selectiv-
ity processes raised by McCombs and Shaw in their orig-
inal 1972 article.
In the following pages, we review research on media 
selections at two levels. First, we examine research on 
how issue preferences affect news selections and agenda 
setting. Second, we look at research bearing on the degree 
to which partisan interests affect news selections and 
agenda setting. Without question these two forms of se-
lection are related, but when thinking about agenda set-
ting, their implications are different and so we consider 
each separately. Throughout, we explore the relationships 
between selectivity and dual-processing approaches to 
the study of agenda setting.
Issue-based information selection and 
agenda setting
Personal interests have become increasingly relevant 
to agenda setting. The expanding number of media choic-
es, driven largely by cable/satellite television and the 
Internet, allows people to find information about their 
unique interests more easily. Instead of waiting for the 
newspaper or television news to cover a preferred issue, 
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interests dictate their media exposure, it seems likely that 
the effect of the media on their interests would be less 
pronounced.
Others, however, are skeptical about declines in the 
media’s agenda-setting power. First, despite documented 
patterns of specialization in news selection, the media 
still may focus on similar issues. Jae Kook lee (2007), 
for example, compared the issue agenda in blogs to the 
issue agenda in mainstream media, finding substantial 
similarities.  Second, selecting content based on issue 
preferences has always been a possibility. Even among 
hard copy newspaper readers, some will jump over public 
affairs sections in favor of sports. By themselves, how-
ever, neither of these explanations accounts for the Althaus 
and Tewksbury (2002) findings. In their study, similar 
content was available in the online and off line version of 
the newspaper yet study participants’ issue agendas dif-
fered.
Two additional explanations are worth considering. 
First, people may encounter a mainstream news agenda 
even if they seek out information about specialized inter-
ests. In the Althaus and Tewksbury (2002) study, respon-
dents in the newspaper reading conditions were asked to 
curtail their news use outside of the study. This may have 
removed naturally-occurring contact with a more main-
stream agenda through a variety of other channels (Web-
ster & Ksiazek, 2012). Given the research on agenda 
cueing, which suggests that it does not take an extensive 
allocation of cognitive effort to understand the news 
agenda, it is at least plausible that the mainstream media 
retain their agenda-setting power despite the availability 
of media content targeting specific issue interests.
Second, and perhaps more compelling, is that agenda 
setting still operates, but the way in which we study it 
must be adjusted to consider niche audiences, as opposed 
to the general public. The arguments thus far focus on 
the magnitude of agenda-setting effects at the aggregate 
level, determined by comparing the overall media and 
public agendas. yet a focus on the psychology of agenda 
setting begs us to focus on individual-level effects. At the 
individual level, even if an individual pursues her own 
interests when making information selections, agenda 
setting still can occur. Here, individuals may find their 
original issue prioritization reinforced, not just in the 
sense of supported or buttressed, but in the full sense of 
strengthened and enhanced. A person passionate about 
the web producing more diversity in the issues named as 
important.
A second experimental study allows us to sort through 
these options more clearly and suggests that there is 
something unique about the experience of browsing online 
news. Scott Althaus and David Tewksbury (2002) hypoth-
esized that agenda-setting effects would vary depending 
on whether people read a hard copy newspaper or an 
online newspaper. They suspected that those browsing a 
newspaper website would be more likely to avoid stories 
about topics that were not of interest than those looking 
at a newspaper off line. Given that U.S. citizens tend to 
be relatively uninterested in international stories, the 
authors suspected that foreign affairs would be a casu-
alty of the Internet newspaper compared to its off line 
counterpart. To test this idea, Althaus and Tewksbury 
randomly assigned study participants to one of three 
conditions: (1) an online newspaper group, where par-
ticipants browsed the New York Times website for 30 min-
utes to an hour each day for a week, (2) an off line news-
paper group, where participants spent the same amount 
of time with the hard copy version of the paper, or (3) a 
control group. The results confirmed what the authors 
suspected:
Readers of the paper version of the New York Times 
were exposed to a broader range of public affairs cov-
erage than readers of the online version of the Times. 
More importantly, readers of the paper version of the 
Times came away with systematically different percep-
tions of the most important problems facing the coun-
try. Subjects in the paper group tended to be rela-
tively more concerned about international issues than 
subjects in the online group (p. 196).
This pattern of results has led scholars in different 
directions. Some suggest that in the aggregate, the media’s 
agenda-setting capacity may be waning (Bennett & Iyen-
gar, 2008; Chaffee & Metzger, 2001). If online news allows 
people to pursue their own agendas, then the media will 
be less inf luential in setting the overall agenda. There’s 
some truth to the idea. If people increasingly avoid main-
stream news content and instead focus on news about 
specific issues, then the observed correspondences between 
the media agenda and the public agenda, at large, should 
decline in magnitude. Both the Althaus and Tewksbury 
(2002) and Nie et al. (2010) studies could be read as pro-
viding supportive evidence. Further, if people’s issue 
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McCombs and Shaw recruited undecided voters for the 
study. Although this high Need for Orientation group was 
a smart choice in many regards, the Chapel Hill study 
did not tell us about agenda setting among Partisans. 
later research documented that Independents were more 
likely to display agenda-setting effects than Partisans 
(Iyengar & Kinder, 1989), a finding that could be inter-
preted in light of research on Need for Orientation. Par-
tisans should be more certain than Independents and thus 
score lower on Need for Orientation, holding relevance 
constant.
But in the contemporary media environment, where 
partisan media options are available, it is less clear that 
Partisans will display weaker agenda-setting effects.  Par-
tisans may use more news media, thus increasing aggre-
gate agenda-setting effects relative to Independents (Ca-
maj, 2012). Further, Partisans find likeminded media 
trustworthy.  Research suggests that trust can enhance 
agenda-setting effects (Miller & Krosnick, 2000; Tsfati, 
2003). Drawing from Pingree and Stoycheff (2013), high-
er gatekeeping trust could increase the likelihood of 
agenda-setting effects via a peripheral route. We return 
to this idea shortly.
A second detail of the McCombs and Shaw study worth 
ref lection is the changes in the media environment that 
have occurred since their original study. Citizens today 
are faced with many more media sources that cover poli-
tics in distinctly different ways than were available during 
the Chapel Hill study. The availability of more outlets 
increases the chances that people will choose likeminded 
content (Fischer, Schultz-Hardt, & Frey, 2008). Indeed, 
numerous studies demonstrate contemporary preferences 
for likeminded political information, whether looking at 
the selection of pro-attitudinal articles on a web site 
(Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2009) or news from 
sources known to cover the news from a particular po-
litical bent (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Stroud, 2008). Just 
as the news has fragmented, agenda-setting effects may 
fragment as well. Instead of the media fostering a similar 
agenda across citizens, it may facilitate the creation of 
many different agendas that correspond to different me-
dia diets.
Several studies have analyzed agenda-setting effects 
taking selective exposure into account. In the book Niche 
News, Stroud (2011) analyzes whether those using conser-
vative-leaning media name different issues as most im-
gun rights and looking mainly at gun rights media cover-
age may subsequently believe that the issue is even more 
important.
Research on issue-based information selection has 
focused mainly on first-level agenda-setting effects, ask-
ing whether individuals finding certain issues interesting 
will seek out information related to their issue interests 
at the expense of information about other possible issues. 
Although the pursuit of information tailored to specific 
issue preferences could dampen aggregate-level agenda-
setting effects, this has not yet been established. And 
although aggregate-level effects could decline, individu-
al-level agenda-setting effects could be enhanced if issue-
specific niche media reinforce people’s passion about those 
issues.  Returning to the question that opened this section, 
we suggest that yes, the media will continue to affect the 
issues people consider important and yes, people’s impres-
sions of important issues do affect their media diet.
Partisan-based information selection and 
agenda setting
In addition to the pursuit of certain topics in the media, 
citizens also can choose news from a preferred perspec-
tive. Some radio programs, television stations, and websites 
have identifiable political biases and are targeted toward 
people holding similar beliefs. The selection of politi-
cally likeminded media, a behavior known as selective 
exposure, potentially affects both first- and second-level 
agenda setting. The original Chapel Hill study foreshad-
owed an intersection between the selective exposure and 
agenda-setting research traditions. In this study, McCombs 
and Shaw (1972) found that media coverage of the parties’ 
issue agendas differed – coverage of Democrats Humphrey 
and Muskie, for instance, featured more foreign policy 
than coverage of Republicans Nixon and Agnew. In spite 
of differences in media coverage, undecided voters inclined 
to vote for Humphrey and undecided voters inclined to 
vote for Nixon had strikingly similar issue agendas. It did 
not matter which candidate people preferred. And it did 
not matter that the media emphasized different issues 
when covering different candidates. The media’s agenda 
and citizens’ issue priorities, in the aggregate, were strong-
ly correlated.
Two features of the Chapel Hill study, however, war-
rant ref lection based on today’s media environment. First, 
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Expanding the paths: Need for Orientation & 
Attribute Agenda Setting
[In contrast to the widely used sequential measure of 
Need for Orientation in which the sub-concept of 
relevance is prioritized over the sub-concept of uncer-
tainty, another] operational definition of NFO is based 
on “the simultaneous measurement of NFO” which 
considers the two sub-concepts in a 2 x 2 typology, 
defined by high and low relevance and high and low 
uncertainty (Weaver, 1980). This approach produces 
four levels of NFO, making operational (if not theo-
retical) distinctions between the two moderate levels 
of NFO. …… ‘moderate-active NFO’ [high relevance 
/ low uncertainty] and ‘moderate-passive NFO’ [low 
relevance /  high uncertainty]…
Camaj (2012)
In a paper presented at the Association for Education 
in Journalism and Mass Communication Conference in 
2012, lindita Camaj provides a thoughtful integration of 
the psychological processes we have covered thus far in 
our analyses. She suggests that Need for Orientation is 
related to partisan patterns of media consumption. Spe-
cifically, Camaj decomposes the two elements of the Need 
for Orientation, uncertainty and relevance, into the 2 x 
2 matrix diagrammed in Figure 3.
She argues that these four cells should have different 
media use patterns. Those with High Need for Orientation 
should turn to mainstream media for news and informa-
tion. Those with a Moderate-Active Need for Orientation, 
who have low uncertainty and high perceptions of rele-
vance, Camaj contends, should be the most likely to look 
at partisan media. Camaj finds that, indeed, the Moderate-
portant compared to those using liberal-leaning media. 
Using data from the 2004 National Annenberg Election 
Survey, Stroud found that there were differences in issues 
named as important depending on the media sources on 
which people relied. Those using conservative-leaning 
media were more likely to name the “war on terrorism” 
as the most important issue facing the nation and those 
using liberal-leaning media were more likely to name 
“Iraq.” Interestingly, and similar to the Chapel Hill study, 
these effects were infrequently moderated by partisanship.
A content analysis revealed modest differences among 
liberal and conservative media in their relative rates of 
covering Iraq and the war on terrorism. More profound 
differences in the coverage appeared when looking at how 
the media covered the attributes of each issue. liberal 
media portrayed Iraq as a quagmire distinct from the war 
on terror more frequently than conservative media. These 
results suggest that the effects of partisan media may be 
more related to second-level, compared to first-level, 
agenda-setting effects.
More recent work is suggestive that partisan media 
may be particularly inf luential at the second level of 
agenda setting. Partisan outlets may cover similar issues 
(first-level), but offer substantially different takes on those 
issues (second-level). Although not from an agenda-setting 
perspective, lauren Feldman and her colleagues (2012) 
identify differences in how CNN, MSNBC, and Fox News 
covered global warming. Audiences, in turn, held attitudes 
about global warming that were in keeping with the out-
lets that they watched. Muddiman, Stroud, and McCombs 
(forthcoming) also find evidence supporting second-level 
agenda setting in their analysis of cable news use and 
viewers’ attitudes about Iraq.
Figure 3. Need for Orientation: The “simultaneous measurement” model (Camaj, 2012).
NEED FOR ORIENTATION
Uncertainty
low High
Relevance
low low NFO Moderate – Passive NFO
High Moderate – Active NFO High NFO
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rather than kind. Those with Moderate-Active NFO may 
be more motivated than those with High NFO to process 
information via a central route.
A precedent for thinking about effects in this way 
comes from the work on motivated reasoning (Kunda, 
1990). Motivated reasoning proposes two different goals 
that can motivate people:  accuracy goals, whereby people 
are motivated to reach a correct conclusion, and direc-
tional goals, whereby people are motivated to reach a 
conclusion that coheres with their previously-held beliefs. 
It may be that those high in NFO are motivated by ac-
curacy goals and those with Moderate-Active NFO are 
motivated by directional goals. Conceptually, these dis-
tinctions are aligned. Interested partisans (the Moderate-
Active group with low uncertainty and high relevance) 
are likely motivated, and motivated by some sense of their 
preferred outcome. Their partisan identity may motivate 
them to see attributes aligned with their partisanship as 
more salient than other attributes. Interested independents 
(the High NFO group with high uncertainty and relevance) 
are motivated too, but motivated more by accuracy than 
directional goals. Those with directional goals engage in 
more biased information seeking than those with accu-
racy goals (Kim, 2007; Kunda, 1990) – exactly what 
Camaj observes when the High NFO group used less 
partisan media than the Moderate-Active NFO group. 
The most interesting part, however, is how a motivated 
reasoning explanation can account for Camaj’s attribute 
agenda-setting findings. To do so, however, we first need 
to describe another research project done by young Mie 
Kim (2007).
Kim (2007) conducted an experiment about the issue 
of abortion where she manipulated whether people were 
motivated by directional goals or by accuracy goals. She 
also categorized people as either issue public members, 
those rating the issue of abortion as personally important, 
or as members of the general public, those indicating that 
abortion was less personally important. let us interject 
to encourage the reader to consider the possible parallels 
between Kim’s categories and our desire to explain Camaj’s 
results (see Figure 4). Those who are members of an issue 
public and have directional goals are similar to the Mod-
erate-Active NFO group: both are high in relevance (po-
litical interest) and low in uncertainty (strong political 
views). Those who are members of an issue public and 
have accuracy goals are similar to the High NFO group: 
Active group is unique. 
Operationally, those with Moderate-Active NFO in 
her model are those who are interested in politics (high 
relevance) and have strong partisan identities (low uncer-
tainty). She also categorizes media in Kosovo, where she 
conducts her study, as independent or partisan on the 
basis of their ownership and coverage. Results reveal that 
the Moderate-Active group used independent media as 
frequently as the High NFO group, and that both groups 
use independent media more frequently than the Moder-
ate-Passive and low NFO groups. yet the Moderate-
Active group is more likely than any other to use partisan 
media, especially partisan television. Adding a cross- 
cultural perspective, the results square with findings from 
Stroud (2011), who finds that strong Partisans interested 
in politics are more likely than others to use partisan 
media.
Camaj (2012) goes a step further, suggesting that those 
with High NFO should, based on their diet of independent 
media, display second-level agenda-setting effects on the 
basis of gaining knowledge from the media about which 
issues are most important. Those with Moderate-Active 
NFO, she suggests, should display second-level agenda-
setting effects based on reinforcement. Although her data 
do not allow her to test these different processes, she is 
able to compare attribute agenda setting among those 
with various levels of NFO. Her data demonstrate that 
those with Moderate-Active NFO display the greatest 
evidence of attribute agenda setting, where the issue at-
tributes they find important align with the salience of the 
attributes in media coverage, and those with low NFO 
display the least attribute agenda setting.
The results raise new questions. Why might the Mod-
erate-Active NFO group display higher attribute agenda-
setting effects? It could be that they simply spend more 
time with the media. Providing some evidence, Camaj’s 
results show that this group has the highest levels of ex-
posure to partisan media and exposure to independent 
media at the same level as the High NFO group. Higher 
levels of exposure to the media may translate into stron-
ger agenda-setting effects, particularly via the deliberative 
route to agenda setting that we’ve outlined previously. 
Another possibility is that regardless of how much time 
they spend with media, those in the Moderate-Active 
NFO group are more motivated to process the media. It 
may be that deliberative processing is a matter of degree, 
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both are high in relevance and high in uncertainty. What 
we are suggesting is that Moderate-Actives may be moti-
vated more by directional goals and those high in NFO 
may be motivated more by accuracy goals.
Returning to Kim’s study, participants browsed a por-
tal website containing information about two political 
candidates’ positions on abortion and other issues. Af-
terward, study participants were asked to indicate how 
they felt about the candidates on feeling thermometers. 
Kim analysed whether goals (directional, accuracy) and 
issue importance (issue public, general public) interacted 
to predict extremity in candidate evaluations. Her results, 
which are presented in the top portion of Figure 5, are 
revealing.
Although candidate evaluations are notably different 
from attribute agenda setting, the consistency of the find-
ings is noteworthy. Compare Kim’s results in Figure 5 to 
those from Camaj in the bottom portion of Figure 5.
As shown in Figure 5, both Kim (2007) and Camaj 
(2012) find greater effects for those high in relevance, such 
as issue public members, and low in uncertainty, such as 
those motivated by directional goals. This Moderate-
Active group displays the highest attribute agenda-setting 
effects (Camaj, 2012) and the greatest extremity in can-
didate attitudes (Kim, 2007).
The greater effects among the Moderate-Actives may 
be particularly likely when considering second-level agen-
da setting. Partisan media outlets – consumed more by 
the Moderate-Actives than by the High NFO group – 
emphasize aspects of issues that privilege a preferred 
party’s perspective (Jamieson & Cappella, 2008; leven-
dusky, 2013). Further, likeminded media are more trust-
ed, and trust predicts agenda-setting effects (Miller & 
Krosnick, 2000; Pingree & Stoycheff, 2013; Tsfati, 2003). 
If the trusted, partisan media sources used by the Moder-
ate Active group emphasize issue attributes that satisfy 
a directional goal, the Moderate Active group would be 
expected to display heightened attribute agenda-setting 
effects.
The same pattern may not appear when looking at 
first-level agenda setting.  Research suggests that the 
media often emphasize similar issues, even if they feature 
different attributes (e.g., lee, 2007; McCombs & Shaw, 
1972).  When the media emphasize similar issues, we 
anticipate that the High NFO and Moderate-Active NFO 
groups would display similar agenda-setting effects that 
would be stronger than the Moderate-Passive NFO and 
low NFO groups.
When different issues are emphasized across the me-
dia, however, the Moderate-Active NFO group may ex-
hibit greater first-level agenda-setting effects than the 
High NFO group. This arguably would be particularly 
likely when partisan outlets critique other media for in-
sufficiently covering an issue, or make a case for why 
certain issues should be seen as more important than 
others for partisan reasons (levendusky, 2013; Stroud, 
2011). A similarly intensified agenda-setting effect may 
occur among those motivated to seek messages relevant 
to an issue about which they are particularly passionate. 
Here, those motivated by an interest in a particular issue 
may see a lack of coverage by the traditional media as 
problematic and trust sources covering a pet issue more. 
When consuming trusted media covering a favoured is-
sue, the individual, first-level agenda-setting effect may 
be enhanced.  These musings are at best highly specula-
tive, but they suggest one way to make sense of the Camaj 
findings from a psychological approach.
This merger of motivated reasoning and Camaj’s con-
ceptual distinction between Moderate-Active NFO and 
High NFO is an important addition to the paths leading 
Figure 4. A conceptual merger of Kim and Camaj.
MODERATE-ACTIVE NFO HIGH NFO
Low uncertainty = directional goals 
(strong partisanship)
High uncertainty = accuracy goals 
(weak partisanship)
High relevance = issue public member 
(high political interest)
High relevance = issue public member 
(high political interest)
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to agenda-setting effects. lee (2013) notes that while Need 
for Orientation predicts the amount of information an 
individual will seek in the media, the distinction between 
accuracy and directional goals identifies what kind of 
content an individual will seek. The two concepts in 
tandem offer a more complete picture of information-
seeking behaviour.
This tandem explanation for a stronger agenda-setting 
effect among the Moderate-Active NFO group in Camaj’s 
study is further buttressed by reference to the Elaboration 
likelihood Model (ElM), which holds that strong effects 
primarily occur as a cognitive process achieved through 
a centrally routed message processing when two condi-
tions are met: people are motivated (the information 
presented to them is relevant) and they are able to process 
the new information presented to them (have some previ-
ous knowledge that enable them to understand) (Camaj, 
2013). People with Moderate-Active NFO in Camaj’s study 
are also the most politically active people (highly inter-
ested in politics and with strong political affiliation). 
Thus, we can assume that this category of people also has 
the most ability to process political messages in the media, 
given their predisposition towards and knowledge of 
politics. Previous studies and an earlier section of this 
paper emphasize the relevance of knowledge activation 
for agenda-setting effects. Bulkow et al.’s study also sug-
gests that high involvement with an issue is more likely 
to result in reading more articles about the issue and more 
persistent effects. People with high involvement in an 
issue are also more knowledgeable about that issue. Thus, 
both motivated reasoning and facilitated reasoning might 
impact the strength of agenda-setting effects and provide 
explanations on how these effects occur, especially at the 
second level of agenda setting.
The theoretical merger of all these concepts culminates 
in a process known as agenda-melding.
Agenda Melding
We mix agenda objects and attributes from a variety 
of media to construct a picture of the world, a process 
so integrative we use the term agendamelding. 
Agendamelding is the way we balance agendas of 
civic community and our valued reference communi-
ties with our own views and experiences to create a 
satisfying picture of the world.
(Shaw & Weaver, 2014, p.145)
In the vast media landscape there are many agendas. 
Camaj (2012) focused on two of the most important sets, 
independent media and partisan media. Donald Shaw’s 
concept of agenda melding focuses on how people mix 
the elements from a variety of agendas to construct their 
pictures of the world (Shaw, Hamm & Terry, 2006). Agen-
da melding does not replace media agenda setting, but 
rather seeks to explain why the strength of media agenda 
setting varies between different media, groups and indi-
viduals.
Figure 5. A comparison of Kim and Camaj’s research findings.
A. Extremity of evaluations by goals and public issue membership (Kim, 2007)
DIRECTIONAl GOAlS ACCURACy GOAlS
GENERAl PUBlIC low Medium
ISSUE PUBlIC High Medium
B. Attribute agenda-setting effects by uncertainty and relevance (Camaj, 2012)
lOW UNCERTAINTy HIGH UNCERTAINTy
lOW RElEVANCE low Medium
HIGH RElEVANCE High Medium
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the other three NFO groups. And, as noted previously, 
Moderate-Active NFO citizens showed stronger attribute 
agenda-setting effects. Does this suggest that members 
of this group meld their personal attribute agenda in a 
different manner as a result of exposure to partisan media? 
In other words, for this group, are partisan media par-
ticularly successful agenda-setters? Our analysis of direc-
tional and accuracy goals is suggestive. The agenda-
melding perspective represents an important conclusion 
to the psychological explanations we’ve offered. The 
media people use, the goals and orientations that motivate 
their media use, and the depth of information processing 
that occurs when encountering media information all 
combine to create individual agenda-setting effects.
Conclusion
Agenda setting has come a long way from McCombs 
and Shaw’s (1972) demonstration of a correlation between 
the issues emphasized in the media and the issues identi-
fied as important by the public. The basic hypothesis has 
garnered substantial support across forty years of research 
and numerous extensions have been tested. In this article, 
we analysed the psychological underpinnings of agenda 
setting. After the early discovery of the Need for Orienta-
tion, research on why agenda setting occurs stalled. As 
the media environment has evolved, and as it increas-
ingly requires people to actively seek information, schol-
arship has returned to the psychological factors that mod-
erate and explain media selections and effects. The recent 
surge in scholarship connecting agenda setting with psy-
chological perspectives on information selection and 
processing guided our review. In Figure 6 below, we sum-
marize the emerging psychological model. This figure is 
an important contribution, as it summarizes a theoretical 
framework for studying the psychology of agenda setting. 
Although some components are well established, such as 
the link between agenda setting and Need for Orientation, 
others are mere hypotheses requiring additional testing, 
such as the relationship between motivated reasoning and 
agenda setting.
The way in which people process mediated information 
conditions the agenda-setting effects that result. Research 
suggests a dual path model. Some casually engage with 
the media while others are more deliberative. The extent 
Agenda setting varies among individuals based on the 
media content that they use. Muddiman, Stroud, and 
McCombs (forthcoming) found that using various cable 
news outlets affected second-level agenda-setting percep-
tions about U.S. involvement in Iraq in the lead-up to the 
2008 election.  According to the survey results, “people 
who watched Fox News had a .63 expected probability of 
saying the U.S. should withdraw troops, all else held 
constant.  People who watched CNN had a .80 expected 
probability.  Watching Fox News and CNN led to an 
expected probability of .72.”  This finding suggests that 
people watching multiple cable news outlets meld the 
agendas, arriving at a different conclusion than those 
watching only one outlet.
Agenda melding also places an emphasis on individ-
ual differences and values. Explicitly linking individual 
values and agenda-setting effects, Valenzuela (2010) fo-
cused on Inglehart’s (1977, 1990) concept of materialist 
and post-materialist values. Using a content analysis of 
major daily newspapers across Canada and survey data 
from a nationally representative sample, Valenzuela found 
stronger agenda-setting effects at both the aggregate and 
individual levels among persons with materialist values 
than among those with post-materialist values. At the 
aggregate level, for example, the correlation between the 
media agenda and the public agenda was .55 for material-
ists and .35 for post-materialists. These findings ref lect 
the media’s greater emphasis on materialist issues such 
as the economy and crime relative to post-materialist is-
sues such as the environment and political reform.
Within the media, the key distinction made by agenda 
melding is between mainstream vertical media, which reach 
down through many strata of society to build a mass 
audience, and horizontal media, which seek out audi-
ences with special interests or specific points of view. 
Shaw and Weaver (2014, p.145) note:
Vertical media provide the main news agenda for 
public life and horizontal media provide the support-
ing information and perspectives that supplement the 
vertical agenda. In politics, we also have preferences 
and voting histories. These are unseen ingredients that 
help us mix, or meld, agendas from vertical and hori-
zontal media into personally satisfying agenda com-
munities.
In Camaj’s Kosovo study, Moderate-Active NFO citi-
zens made greater use of horizontal partisan media than 
McCombs & Stroud
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when partisan media emphasize issues and attributes 
aligned with one’s political identity. Finally, those with 
High NFO, driven by accuracy goals, will seek and engage 
in effortful processing of mainstream media messages, 
which then will produce high levels of first-level agenda-
setting and moderate second-level agenda-setting effects.
Overall, this article had three objectives. First, we 
summarized contemporary research on the psychology 
of agenda-setting effects with an emphasis on the dual 
information processing paths and media selection. Second, 
we offered several empirically- and theoretically-derived 
directions for future research. Connections between 
agenda setting and motivated reasoning, for example, 
need further attention (see lee, 2013). Third, we have 
provided the most comprehensive model to-date of the 
psychology of agenda setting. We hope that this piece 
serves to set the agenda for continued attention to the 
psychology behind agenda-setting effects.
of information processing is related to Need for Orienta-
tion; those more passively using media have lower NFO 
than those actively using media. Further, those with 
Moderate-Active NFO use partisan media more than 
those with High NFO. Based on this pattern, those with 
Moderate-Active NFO may be motivated by directional 
goals and those with High NFO by accuracy goals. The 
strength of agenda-setting effects thus depends on infor-
mation processing, goals, and media selection.
This can be thought of as a causal model where orien-
tations and motivations result in a certain mediated ex-
perience, which in turn causes agenda-setting effects. 
Those with low and Moderate-Passive NFO process 
mediated information passively and use the media rela-
tively infrequently, resulting in limited agenda-setting 
effects. Those with Moderate-Active NFO, driven by 
directional goals, engage in effortful processing of media 
content and seek more partisan outlets. This combination 
can result in a particularly potent agenda-setting effect 
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Figure 6. A summary of “dual path” agenda-setting research.
MEDIA ExPERIENCE
Casual Exposure  g  Awareness Deliberate Exposure  g  Awareness + Comprehension
INFORMATION PROCESSING
Accessibility bias Active inference (Takeshita) 
Subconscious processing Active information seeking (Bulkow, Urban and Schweiger)
Agenda cueing Agenda reasoning (Pingree and Stoycheff )
MEDIA USE
Mainstream low Mainstream low Mainstream high Mainstream high
Niche low Niche low Niche high Niche high
Niche > = Mainstream Mainstream > Niche
FIRST-lEVEl AGENDA-SETTING EFFECTS
low low High High
SECOND-lEVEl AGENDA-SETTING EFFECTS
Low Moderate High Moderate
Presentation cues important Content cues important
low NFO Moderate-Passive NFO Moderate-Active NFO High NFO (Camaj)
Directional Goal Accuracy Goal
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